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| The Evolving U.S. Strategic Landscape: A Fresh Look at Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons |
Jeremy Tamsett
December 01, 2003 |
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The Evolving U.S. Strategic Landscape: A Fresh Look at Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons
[by Jeremy Tamsett, Graduate Research Assistant at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California]
Executive Summary
The argument within the Bush Administration is that the greater the war-fighting capacity of the United States, the more credible its overall deterrent posture will be. Therefore, the deployment of mini-nukes in the U.S. would increase the range of options that the American leadership would have at its disposal ?to ensure flexibility in decision-making? in a time of crisis.[1] In reality, no U.S. president wants to be faced with a ?now or never? decision to launch one or more of its high-yield nuclear weapons against an enemy because of the obvious indiscriminate carnage and destruction that such a weapon would instantaneously create.[2] Perhaps the timeless words of President Richard Nixon in a 1970 foreign policy report to Congress best encapsulate the present need for a more flexible nuclear infrastructure in which he asked, ?Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans??[3]
In the absence of a similarly-armed near-peer competitor and adversary, America?s current high-yield arsenal is ?self-deterring? because the costs and consequences of their use against any adversary outweighs all of the potential benefits that might otherwise be derived, largely because of universal principles of proportionality and politically unacceptable levels of collateral damage. Therefore, the advent of mini-nukes could add a ?step? in the ?ladder? of escalation in a conflict, and may be useful in assuring the destruction of a target without incurring the logistical, political, and economic costs associated with a high-yield nuclear or large-scale conventional response. America traditionally has relied upon its high-yield nuclear arsenal for deterrence and is likely to continue to do so in the future; however, it may now be time for U.S. nuclear policy to incorporate low-yield nuclear weapons into its force matrix in order to more credibly communicate its deterrent posture. Consequently, mini-nukes may provide an ?intermediate response? between conventional weapons and high-yield nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the capability of the United States to adequately deal with a broad-range of future contingencies.
A Closer Look at Mini-Nukes: Fourth-Generation Nuclear Weapons
Many critics of low-yield nuclear weapons (a.k.a. mini-nukes) have a fundamental misconception about what that term actually means. In the legal, Congressional sense of the definition, it simply means any nuclear device with a yield at or below 5kt as set forth by the 1994 Spratt-Furse Amendment. However, because the U.S. Congress does not differentiate between fission and fusion nuclear warheads, experts commonly characterize low-yield nuclear weapons as 5kt fission devices. This conclusion is understandable when one considers the fact that of the two types of nuclear weapons, fission and fusion, fission is perhaps the easier of the two to conceptually understand and ultimately field in the real world. While the focus on 5kt fission weapons has engendered some heated and entertaining discourse, ultimately the debate is misleading because it does not accurately represent the true nature of the research and innovation in nuclear technology underway in some of the most developed countries in the world.
For instance, the United States, France and Germany all have very advanced inertial confinement facilities (ICF) capable of producing small-scale pure-fusion experiments, which could eventually find practical applications in low-yield nuclear weapons designs. Additionally, the Russians, Chinese, French, British and Indians all have active and advanced nuclear research programs. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States does not fall behind the rest of the world technologically and militarily because of a lack of understanding of this technology and the potential role that new nuclear weapons may play in shaping the future global security environment.[4] The implication of arguments structured on incorrect assumptions about the future of global nuclear enterprise is that attention is focused on analysis of the wrong problem for the right reasons. The purpose of this paper is to show how the vast majority of critics of mini-nukes premise their assumptions and conclusion on data that does not confer with the actual course of events in the field of nuclear research world-wide, namely in the United States. It is important to note that pure-fusion nuclear weapons do not currently exist; however, with adequate funding and a clear political mandate to do so, it seems likely, based on the evidence presented in this paper, that such weapons could potentially be developed and deployed by the United States.
Organization of the Paper
The paper begins with a definition of what mini-nukes are, or more accurately, what they will most likely be, and why they are called fourth-generation nuclear weapons. The second section discusses in detail the widely-revered, but ultimately flawed ?Nelson Report?, focusing in particular on the penetration capabilities of missiles. The third section will examine how the deployment of mini-nukes might affect the continued viability of the international non-proliferation regime by addressing some of the concerns that non-nuclear weapon states have regarding vertical proliferation in the United States. The fourth section introduces the role that mini-nukes may be able to play in the realm of arms control, and how they may function to bolster the deterrent posture of the United States. The final section will address the issue of the nuclear taboo, and what implications mini-nukes may have on lowering the nuclear threshold.
Ultimately, however, one must recognize the possibility that fourth-generation mini-nukes may not be developed by the United States, and much of the following discourse will become irrelevant. However, in the eventuality that these weapons are deployed in the future, much of the information presented in this paper hopefully will contribute to a more informed public understanding of what these weapons are, and in what ways they may affect the evolution of the global security environment.
Section 1: Defining Mini-Nukes
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator: It?s Not a Mini-Nuke!
Many news reports and critical reviews of ?low-yield? nuclear weapons confuse the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), which is really a high-yield nuclear device, with advanced nuclear weapon research of low-yield design. In reality, the RNEP, if developed, would consist of a new type of delivery device, not a new type of nuclear weapon. Therefore, the RNEP is not defined as a low-yield fourth-generation nuclear weapon. The RNEP is currently a ?concept-only? weapon that seeks to modify a pre-existing, high-yield nuclear warhead into a ground-penetrating weapon that could hold at risk hardened or deeply-buried targets (HDBT). The total cost for the study of the feasibility of the weapon, based either on the B61 or B83 warhead is $45 million dollars, $15 of which was allocated beginning in FY 2003, and $7.5 million more of which has been allocated in FY 2004, with the remaining $22.5 million presumably to be allocated in 2005.[5] The RNEP does not include the Nation?s current B61-11 ?bunker-buster? because of the relatively shallow depths that the gravity bomb is able to achieve. That fact, coupled with its 100kt warhead, makes the B61-11 an undesirable weapon of choice to destroy HDBT and related facilities because its depth of burial would be in close proximity to the surface and would endanger the lives of innocents living downwind.
The Four Generations of Nuclear Weapons
The first and second-generation nuclear weapons were the atomic and hydrogen (thermonuclear) devices built during the 1940?s and early 1950?s. Compared with today?s technology, these weapons relied on relatively simple physics. The third-generation of nuclear weapons consisted of neutron bombs and ?revolutionary? new delivery platforms, such as artillery pieces and short-range missiles, which were designed in the late 1950?s.[6] The third-generation of nuclear weapons extends up to the present era; however, the main difference between the nuclear weapons that were deployed in the Korean theater and those that were developed during the Cold War was the way in which the bombs were designed. As the nature of the threat shifted to the European theater in the 1960?s through the 1980?s, neutron bombs were touted as effective countermeasures against Soviet troops while leaving the infrastructure of America?s European allies largely intact. However, third-generation neutron bombs were not as ?clean? as their supporters claimed, because about half of their potency was derived from a fission-triggering mechanism.[7] In fact, the shells of such weapons were made with chromium and nickel in order to maximize neutron dispersal against enemy ground forces.[8]
According to Andre Gsponer of the Independent Scientific Research Institute (ISRI) in Geneva, fourth-generation nuclear weapons are those that will be ?developed in full compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) using inertial confinement fusion (ICF) facilities such as the National Ignition Facility (NIF) in the United States, and other advanced technologies which are under active development in all the major nuclear-weapons states.?[9] Fourth-generation nuclear weapons would differ from their ancestors because their ?physics-package? would be based solely on a pure-fusion ?secondary? without the need for a fission-based triggering mechanism, or ?primary? (see Appendix B).
One of the reasons that fourth-generation nuclear weapons would most likely be made with ?micro-fusion? technology is because they are fundamentally easier to design than micro-fission explosives.[10] Furthermore, such weapons would be politically more desirable than their fission-based counterparts because the radiological consequence of their detonation would be virtually negligible. According to Andre Gsponer, ?since these new weapons will use no (or very little) fissionable materials, they will produce virtually no radioactive fallout. Their proponents will define them as ?clean? nuclear weapons - and possibly draw a parallel between their battlefield use and the consequences of the expenditure of depleted uranium (DU) ammunition.?[11] A study conducted by Gsponer and his colleagues at ISRI revealed that the 40 tons of depleted Uranium-238 used in the conflict in Yugoslavia emitted the same amount of radiological material as would have 60kt ?of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons.?[12] They concluded that ?the expenditure of many tons of DU has a radiological impact comparable to the combat use of many kilotons of pure fusion.?[13] Consequently, in all of the engagements in which the United States used DU weapons, ?a fourth generation nuclear warhead with a yield in range of one to one hundred tons of high explosive equivalent? could have been substituted ?instead of the few tens or hundreds of kilograms of high explosives? that were actually used given the relative comparison between the dispersal of radiological elements for DU weapons and mini-nukes.[14] Therefore, mini-nukes may even be radiologically safer than their conventional counterparts in the United States, where the casings and shells of munitions are almost all ubiquitously hardened with depleted-uranium.
Characteristics of Pure-Fusion Warheads
The ?physics package? in the warheads of pure-fusion, fourth-generation nuclear weapons are likely to be comprised of a deuterium-tritium (D-T) reaction because the relative impact of unspent tritium on the surrounding environment would be extremely low as a result of the low radioactivity of tritium.[15] Tritium emits fairly weak beta emissions that cannot even penetrate human skin. Small amounts of argon-41 would also be released from the D-T fusion, which is also relatively harmless. However, the D-T reaction also produces neutrons, which produce Carbon-14 when mixed with the air, and Cobalt-60 and Sodium-22 when mixed with structures comprised of soil and concrete.[16] However, only a very limited amount of this material would be contaminated and considered dangerous because most of the neutrons released during the explosion would be absorbed by the ground, thereby constraining the blunt of the radiological effects of the explosion to the immediate blast area, namely underground.[17] Furthermore, Sam Cohen, the inventor of the neutron bomb, claims that it is possible to pre-determine the shape and pattern of a neutron blast, which if exploited, would enable the majority of the neutrons released in a pure-fusion explosion to be directed downward and laterally in order to minimize the amount of neutron discharge into the atmosphere.[18]
Several advantages could be derived from the employment of low-yield mini-nukes on the battlefield. For instance, the ?physics package? of a fourth-generation nuclear device, according to Gsponer, would be ?relatively simple and forgiving.? While the arming and triggering mechanisms required to activate the atomic reactions of the nuclear material itself are relatively more complicated, Gsponer notes that all of these ancillary components ?are submitted to very stringent requirements for security, safety, and reliable performance under sever conditions.?[19] As a general principle, the smaller the electromechanical system upon which a device operates, the more enduring and resistant are its components to exogenous stresses.[20] Therefore, the recognition of the need for extremely stable triggering mechanisms for nuclear warheads, which are subject to forces of high acceleration upon impact with the earth or otherwise hardened target, led the nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States to pioneer the science of nanotechnology. Consequently, the triggering mechanisms of modern nuclear warheads are small in order to make the components more survivable. Breakthroughs in nanotechnology may provide even further miniaturization of the ancillary components of fourth-generation nuclear weapons that may make the warhead virtually indestructible. According to Gsponer, ?new capacitors, new radiation-resistant integrated circuits, new composite materials capable to withstand high temperatures and accelerations, etc., will enable a further level of miniaturization and a corresponding enhancement of safety and usability of nuclear weapons.?[21]
Because of these technological advancements, the warhead of a micro-fusion mini-nuke would be considerably smaller than that of any conventional warhead, on the order of just a few kilograms or liters.[22] Besides the obvious advantages that would accompany a corresponding decrease in weight and size of these potential mini-nukes, including depth of penetrability, they would be extraordinarily more efficient than conventional HE explosives. For instance, it is known that a pure-fusion physics package ?produces an energy equivalent to 133 tons of high-explosive for each gram of tritium consumed.?[23] Correspondingly, only 9.6kg of tritium are needed to produce a yield of 640,000 tons of HE equivalent, which is 1,600 times more than the total tonnage of DU weapons used in the first Gulf War.[24]
Ultimately, conventional warheads are unsuitable for targets that require deep-penetration and high-energy for mission success. The only types of warheads that are capable of retaining relatively high-yields of energy through the process of miniaturization are ?micro-fusion? nuclear weapons. Consequently, low-yield fourth-generation nuclear weapons could offer the United States a unique capability to penetrate deeper and with more firepower than any other state in the world.
Section II: The ?Nelson Report?
Answering the Critics of Mini-Nukes
Critics of mini-nukes frequently cite work conducted by Dr. Robert W. Nelson, a theoretical physicist on the staff at Princeton University. His seminal report ?Low-Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons?, published by the Federation of American Scientists, is a scientific critique of the possible employment of a 5kt low-yield nuclear weapon by the United States. Undoubtedly, Nelson chose 5kt as the yield for his examination as that number corresponds with the threshold that the 1994 U.S. Congress defined as a low-yield nuclear device. Nelson?s argument is based primarily on his assertion that the laws of physics prevent a gravity bomb from penetrating more than twenty-feet into dry earth, a depth at which Nelson claims would do little more than to blow ?out a massive crater of radioactive dirt, which rains down on the local region with an especially intense and deadly fallout.?[25] Critics of mini-nukes frequently quote the ?Nelson Report? as the definitive, scientific authority that ?proves? that low-yield nuclear weapons simply will not be effective because they are too dangerous, and are no different from their high-yield counterparts.[26] What follows is a critical analysis of the ?Nelson Report?, which seeks to re-examine the assumptions upon which he drew his conclusions. The bottom line is that the application of his study fails to conform to the reality of aforementioned U.S. mini-nuke research and design.
Nelson claims that one of the reasons earth-penetrating nuclear weapons are more deadly than airbursts is because the shallowness of their detonation would release tons of debris into the atmosphere that would inevitably rain down on local populations. The reason that the debris expelled from the explosion is deadly is because it mixes with the highly radioactive products of the fission reaction. In contrast, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was delivered at a height of 1,900 feet so that the radioactivity would be dispersed into the atmosphere to minimize fallout on the ground below. Nelson makes two broad assumptions here, one that the weapon in question is based on a fission warhead, and second that the detonation of the device would be shallow because of his perceived constraints on the depth attainable by any penetrating projectile (see Appendix A). As such, Nelson notes that in order to contain all of the fallout from a 5kt (fissionable) nuclear penetrator, it would need to be buried at a depth of approximately 650 feet, far deeper than the 20 feet that America?s only current ?bunker-buster? (the B61-11) is capable of achieving.[27]
Clearly, penetration depths for Nelson play a crucial role in determining the overall efficacy of using a nuclear-armed penetrating warhead to defeat hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), and much of Nelson?s argument hinges on the assumption that penetration of any nuclear warhead is limited to a few tens of feet. Nelson concedes that depths of up to 100ft. are possible, but not practical to ensure that ?the missile and its contents are not severely damaged.?[28] Correspondingly, his report notes that ?the depth of penetration is limited by the yield strength of the penetrator ? in this case, the missile casing.?[29] Nelson makes the claim that even if a missile is made from the ?very hardest of steels?impact velocities greater than a few kilometers per second will substantially deform and even melt the impactor.?[30] Nelson goes on to claim that even if a missile casing could be made to withstand the extreme stresses placed upon it by traveling through a hard target like the earth, the weapon?s speed must remain below about three kilometers per second to ?protect the warhead and its associated electronics.?[31] However, as the previous section revealed, the pure-fusion nuclear weapons of the future are likely to take advantage of nanotechnology and micromechanical engineering that would miniaturize and subsequently increase the durability of these ancillary components, which could theoretically permit higher velocities for penetration weapons.
Nelson relies heavily upon the ?theory of long-rod penetrability? to substantiate his claim that a missile cannot penetrate into the earth more than ?roughly 10 times the missile length?.[32] This means that a 20ft. long missile should be able to burrow to depths of 200ft. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the depth necessary to fully contain an underground nuclear test in the United States is calculated by the equation D=400(Y)^1/3, where D equals depth, and Y equals the yield of the device.[33] This means that a .5kt (500 tons TNT equivalent) yield device needs to be buried at a depth of between 320ft - 370ft, and a .1kt device (100 tons TNT equivalent) needs to be buried at a depth of between 185ft - 230ft in order to be fully contained, but depths less than this can obviously still accommodate the explosion and minimize radiation distribution (see Appendix A). This means that if Nelson?s kinetic-energy equations are correct, then a twenty-foot long missile carrying a .1kt fission warhead should be able to reach a sufficient depth (200 ft.) to contain most, if not all of the fallout. However, Nelson?s report concludes that ?it is simply not possible for a kinetic energy weapon to penetrate deeply enough into the earth to contain a nuclear explosion.?[34] This is because of the weaknesses of what Nelson called the ?yield strength of the penetrator?. However, modifications or alterations to a projectile?s casing strength, velocity, and shape may positively affect the outcome of depth of penetrability.
First, it may be possible in the near future to conceive of a technology that would allow a penetrator to reach the earth under kinetic energy, but then utilize an exogenous power source to in effect ?burrow? into the earth at a sustained, albeit reduced rate of acceleration. Even if ?external thrust? mechanisms weren?t feasible, breakthroughs in the development of casings may allow for weapons to exceed Nelson?s bounded-velocity of three-kilometers per second. According to one account, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) believes that is possible for projectiles to reach speeds of up to 16,400ft/s (5,000m/s).[35]
Second, modifications to pre-existing designs may allow new penetrators to be even more durable because they could be made from what I call ?ultra-hard? alloys. For example, David Geohegan, a researcher in ORNL?s (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) Solid State Division (SSD), claims that ?carbon nanotubes have 100 times the tensile strength of steel with one-sixth the weight?, and can be used to reinforce any combination of metal alloys to make them stronger, including such super-hard materials as cobalt and nickel alloys.[36] Therefore, a projectile made with carbon fibers and alloys may enable designers to significantly increase the yield strength of penetrators.
Third, experimenting with different kinds of shapes for a penetrating device may result in an increase in penetrating capability and efficiency. For instance, one group of researchers discovered that a grooved and tapered projectile is more adept to maintaining a linear trajectory through the plane of a target than a standard, smooth missile shape. What this means is that ?conventional? penetrators that utilize a standard ogive-shaped nose followed by a cylindrical casing (like one would see on a standard missile) are subject to deform due to lateral stresses caused upon impact with a hard target. However, by tapering and grooving the projectile from the nose all the way down its length, the penetrator is able to maintain its velocity by minimizing the effects of the debilitating lateral loads.[37] If all three of these conditions were met, in conjunction or at least in varying degrees, it becomes possible to conceive of a high-velocity penetrator capable of impacting the earth at a rate that would satisfice the aforementioned standards of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for the containment of underground nuclear explosions for a .1kt warhead. It might also then be possible to conceive of a projectile penetrating under exogenous power, and not just relying on kinetic energy. The penetrator might then be capable of achieving a higher and/or sustained rate of acceleration through the target material.
The Yield Compensation Solution to the Penetrability Problem
One of the ways to compensate for the limits of penetrability, while still assuring destructive capacity, is to increase the explosive power of the penetrating device. The immediate problem with a ?yield compensation? solution to the ?penetrability problem? is that the larger the desired yield, the larger the given warhead and delivery vehicle. That means that the warhead would require a larger delivery platform, which in turn means that the total possible depth of penetration would be decreased.
An alternative to the yield compensation solution would be to decrease the diameter of the penetrating device, which would allow deeper penetration, albeit with a smaller payload. Damage to the target might be equivalent to the use of higher-yield explosives because delivery platforms (U.S. military aircraft) would be able to carry large amounts of these weapons as a result of their small size and corresponding light weight. Since the destructive radius of any type of explosion is equal to the cube root of its yield, several small, well-placed bombs have the potential to cause more damage than one well-placed high-yield bomb.
In light of these facts, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified the Small Diameter Bomb (SDP) project as a priority under the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).[38] The SDP has several unique advantages over the most common conventional ?bunker-busters? in the U.S. arsenal: the GBU-28 and GBU-37. According to Lisbeth Groslund and David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists, both of these mammoth weapons weigh around 4,000lbs with a 630lb warhead[39]; alternatively, the SDP weighs in at only 250lbs and just one bomb is purportedly able to achieve the same destructive potential of a 2,000lb bomb with only a 50lb warhead.[40] If the delivery platforms of low-yield mini-nukes incorporated small-diameter technology, then they could much more efficiently achieve the same goals as HE explosives by achieving greater penetrability depths.
In addition to these promising prospects for enhanced penetrability, Gronlund and Wright note that even the ?penetration of a few meters increases the underground destructive effects [of a nuclear explosion] by more than a factor of ten for a wide range of warhead yields.?[41] For example, Gronlund and Wright claim that by ?exploding a 10kt nuclear weapon at a depth of one meter would increase the effective yield by a factor of 20, resulting in underground damage equivalent to that of a 200kt weapon exploded at the surface of the ground.?[42] In spite of this, like Nelson, Gronlund and Wright?s concern is that no penetrator can physically be devised that permits a nuclear warhead being buried sufficiently to contain the radioactive fallout from the ensuing nuclear explosion. However, none of the three distinguish between fission and fusion weapons, which pose a problem to their assumptions about the potential lethality of penetrable nuclear weapons.
Section III: Nonproliferation
Mini-Nukes and Non-Proliferation: Confronting the Issues of Disarmament
Nuclear proliferation is more of a concern today that it was during the Cold War, and the United States faces more potential adversaries today than it did in the past.[43] In addition to the five declared nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, Great Britain, China, and France), other states like Israel, India, Pakistan, and now perhaps North Korea possess nuclear weaponry. If North Korea's recent withdrawal from the NPT treaty is any indication of the direction in which international nuclear security is headed, then traditional approaches to nuclear non-proliferation may be inadequate to deal with the problem in the future.[44] A clear understanding of the principal causes of proliferation will help to eliminate false assumptions about the role of U.S. nuclear policy and global nuclear proliferation.
The argument that ?the existence of nuclear weapons anywhere, assures that others will seek them everywhere? is false. While the historical record may indicate that this argument is sufficient for nuclearization, it is not a necessary pre-condition. If it were true that nuclear weapons proliferate simply because they exist, then all forty-four states currently capable of building nuclear weapons would have done so by now.[45] In reality, even though nuclear weapons have been in existence for over fifty-seven years, only eight states have actually acquired them, nine if North Korea?s ?plutonium devices? are included in the count. Nevertheless, disarmament advocates consistently claim that if all states would commit to nuclear disarmament, then there would be no incentives toward proliferation.
Critics all too often discount the efforts made by the United States to honor its NPT obligations in the direction of disarmament, and point to the fact that the United States has expressed an interest in building new nuclear weapons, notably by repealing the ban to research low-yield nuclear weapons.[46] However, at the close of the Cold War, the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States in sum numbered between 60,000 and 75,000 warheads, and that figure dropped to approximately 20,000 in the 1990?s because the efforts of President George H. Bush. By 2012, the arsenals of the United States and Russia will decrease to no more than 3,400 to 4.400 warheads in aggregate because of the SORT treaty signed by President George W. Bush.[47] Clearly there has been a downward trend in stockpile numbers between the United States and Russia, which is part of what Article VI of the NPT calls for. However, Article VI also calls for the ?negotiation in good faith? toward a ?treaty on general and complete disarmament.?[48] This point is more controversial because some may argue that a decrease in the aggregate number of deployable warheads is not necessarily a move towards disarmament; it depends on the motivations and long-term intentions of the United States. Nonetheless, the United States did participate in the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, where negotiations on general and complete disarmament took place and steps to implement that goal were established.[49] Despite these efforts put forth by the United States, the fact remains that all of the states that had tested a nuclear device before January 1, 1967 still maintain their nuclear capability. However, even if the nuclear weapon states under the NPT did disarm, it does not follow that pressures to proliferate would automatically be removed.
As an alternative, it may be that pressures to proliferate stem from the anarchical nature of the international system and the inherent insecurity that is derived from that structure. In fact, the preamble to the NPT specifically notes the conditional relationship between ?the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.?[50] In other words, it may be that the acute nature of the security environment in which states exist, which fuels uncertainty and exacerbates the security dilemma, promulgates nuclear ambitions and contributes to the proliferation problem.
On the other hand, former chief UN weapons inspector Richard Butler claims that ?virtually no one accepts the iniquitous proposition that the security of the nuclear-weapon states uniquely justifies their continued maintenance of nuclear weapons.?[51] However, the nuclear weapons of the United States, at least as envisioned by the Bush Administration, do more than provide security for American interests: they also are intended to dissuade would-be proliferators from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons offering negative security assurances so long as they remain nuclear-free, and they are intended to prevent another large-scale arms race through the maintenance of a decisive quantitative and qualitative lead such that any attempt to match the U.S. arsenal would be futile. Hence, the reason that the United States intends to maintain a large hedge force is not just to assure its dominance on the world stage as the tenets of realism dictate, but to prevent the occasion of a Cold War II with a nuclear-armed peer competitor in the distant future.
Nonetheless, non-nuclear states may not be deterred by U.S. nuclear forces, and may in fact pursue nuclear weapons programs to further their own security interests despite, as Butler claims, their own objections to current nuclear weapons states maintaining nuclear weapons for the same reasons. For instance, Kurt M. Campbell Senior Vice President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies claims that ?because of the growing uncertainty of the international strategic security environment, nuclear weapons have once again become appealing to those states who once rejected nuclear armament.?[52] This argument seems to suggest that as the intensity of security dilemmas increase, states may ultimately choose to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. In reality, it is important to note that most states joined the NPT because of the shared belief that nuclear weapons would contribute to the exacerbation of security dilemmas, and ?that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war.?[53] For instance, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine are all examples of states that have voluntarily foregone nuclear weapons programs so as to avoid antagonizing potentially hostile relationships with their neighbors.[54]
Therefore, states that choose to participate in the NPT regime may do so primarily because the objectives outlined in the NPT closely match the national priorities of the Parties to the Treaty. In other words, the NPT may act as an international facilitator toward the construction of non-proliferation norms so long as a state?s immediate security interests are not threatened by its continued adherence to the NPT, insofar as it prohibits the development of a nuclear weapons program. For example, according to a 2001 study conducted by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), ?state perceptions of the global and particular regional security situations are the principal drivers of state behavior and policy choices, not international treaty arrangements.?[55] Therefore, while the NPT contains no provisions for enforcement mechanisms if a State or States violates the Treaty, it does create an avenue of incentives for states that choose to participate in the Treaty by granting states the privilege of being law-abiding members of the international community and the protection that negative security assurances provide. However, States may argue that if the costs of adhering to the Treaty outweigh the benefits of membership in the international non-proliferation regime, then a State Party to the Treaty may choose to withdraw, or in the case of Israel, India, and Pakistan, may choose not sign the Treaty at all. However, the vast majority of countries in the world, as evidenced by the 187 signatories to the NPT, argue that no costs exceed the benefits of remaining in the NPT because of the ?devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war? if nuclear weapons were allowed to proliferate.[56]
Nonetheless, critics contend that because a lot of states in the world feel threatened by the United States, then these weaker states have no choice but to take measures to build or purchase nuclear technology as a means of deterring U.S. ?aggression.? North Korea is an excellent contemporary example of the critics assertions, because the obstreperous government in Pyongyang supposedly pulled out of the NPT and resumed its efforts to build nuclear weapons in order to blackmail America into signing a non-aggression pact, as well as to prevent the U.S. from intervening militarily in the region should Washington deem it necessary to ensure the preservation of the international non-proliferation regime, and to honor its security commitments to South Korea and Japan. According to Richard Butler, a state will not pursue nuclear weapons when ?a state determined to cheat has reason to think anything adverse will happen to it if its criminal activity is identified. If the cheating state is able to calculate that no reliable means exist to enforce its non-proliferation obligations, that detection of its activities will bring no remedy or punishment, then the deterrent effect at least wanes considerably, or even disappears entirely.? [57] This is one reason why a commentary published by The Economist on January 18, 2003 noted that ?the real danger to the NPT arises from the temptation to let off the rule-breakers.?[58]
Appeasement, negotiation, and even containment of States in violation of the NPT send a message of tolerance to the actions of these states. The United States is leading the way by sending a new message in the form of the so-called ?Bush Doctrine? that America will no longer sit idly by and watch States ?defect? and develop nuclear from within the NPT, or from without by withdrawing from the Treaty as North Korea did in January 2003. However, some critics of the Bush Administration claim that the hard-line stance taken in the National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction is to blame for the efforts by Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. This view seems to discount the fact that Iran, and North Korea in particular, had been working on developing nuclear programs years before President George W. Bush came to office.[59]
Bargaining, as President Clinton did in the Agreed Framework of 1994, is dangerous and detrimental to the NPT. It sends a message to states that if they want nuclear weapons, all they have to do is threaten the United States and then the U.S. will supply heavy-fuel shipments, and even build light-water reactors in response?all for free. The evidence clearly indicates that Clinton?s attempt to appease Pyongyang with economic incentives only exacerbated the problem by driving North Korea?s nuclear production activities underground and legitimized the process of leveraging the U.S. into ?cutting deals? so that Kim Jong Il?s nuclear program could proceed uninhibited in the face of Clinton?s weak objections to North Korea?s actions. What needs to be done is something different, and if Bush?s ?heavy-handed? tactics didn?t work in the short run, then the pressure needs to be stepped up. The belief that the Agreed Framework defused the nuclear showdown a decade ago is irresponsible because it fails to acknowledge the fact that the North Koreans will not act in good faith to uphold their end of the bargain absent a threat of force. Appeasement, bargaining, and endless negotiations only buy time for the would-be proliferators to do what they want to do anyways, get nuclear weapons.
The North Koreans did not restart their nuclear reactor at Yongbyon because of an energy crisis as one commentator contends.[60] If this were true, there would have been no reason for Pyongyang to kick the IAEA inspectors out in 1994 and again in 2002.[61] Claims that the United States should seek a new ?Agreed Framework? that would provide a better ?sustainable energy future for North Korea? are irrelevant because North Korea would benefit from international economic assistance only if it abandoned its nuclear weapons program. The fact that North Korea has ?been able to produce two plutonium-based nuclear weapons? according to CIA director George Tenet, a full ten years after the Agreed Framework was implemented is ample evidence that declarations and agreements without action are meaningless.[62]
An alternative would be to engage in direct negotiations backed by an explicit threat of force aimed specifically at the leadership of the regime in question. Daryl Kimball Director of the Arms Control Association agrees and claims that direct negotiations with the North Koreans, and presumably all NPT violators, is the best way to settle ?disputes? and to stem nuclear proliferation. Kimball notes that without the threat to use force, ?economic sanctions would do little to stop North Korea?s dangerous nuclear activities and could further escalate tensions.?[63] However, Kimball claims that Clinton?s policy of economic ?engagement?, which precluded the use of force, ?had produced important, if limited, success in freezing Pyongyang?s nuclear weapons and missile activities.?[64] How Kimball justifies the secret development of enriched uranium and the withdrawal from the NPT as ?successful? is not clear.
Diplomacy is the ?tool in the chest? for use with compliant states, sanctions are the tools utilized when diplomacy fails in times of peace, and imminent and decisive war is the tool used when sanctions fail, as they always do when not coupled with the threat of military action. However, diplomacy is not to be discarded as soon as it has been found to be ineffective, for where it fails in one area, such as during the phase when a potential proliferation problem is first identified, it might be useful once again in some other phase of operations down the road. For instance, coercive action without the accompaniment of diplomacy is harmful, because brute intimidation may only breed resentment and hatred. However, threat of military action before the deviant action is taken by the rogue actor coupled with open dialogue is useful because it appeals to the reason of the leadership of that state that the United States means business and that its threats are in fact credible. A state?s acquiescence to diplomacy is one way out of experiencing the excruciating pain of discipline by means of U.S. military action. However, so long as states like North Korea continue to defy the international community by pursuing these deadly weapons, the perceived need of the ?declared states? to retain their arsenals will continue unabated. The United States should not be viewed as the culprit when it comes to despotic leaders consolidating power and seeking hegemony and dominance through the procurement of nuclear weapons, trashing every norm established by decades of international law along the way.
Consequently, if the United States wishes to exert more pressure on North Korea, and to simultaneously send a stern message to other would-be proliferators, then low-yield nuclear weapons may provide one method of credibly communicating to Kim Jong Il that his days are numbered. The point is not that North Korea be blown off the face of the earth, that notion is unrealistic and counter-productive. However, should a crisis on the peninsula escalate out of control to the point that military action was considered inevitable, it would be wise for the United States to possess the capability to successfully wage a war with North Korea that would simultaneously accomplish two primary goals: the defeat of HDBTs in the region that harbor weapons of mass destruction and/or related facilities, and to limit collateral damage. Low-yield nuclear weapons as presented in this paper may be the most desirable answer to that dilemma.
Section V: Mini-Nukes and Arms Control
Mini-Nukes and Arms Control: The Quest for Escalation Dominance
The United States asserts that binding strategic arms agreements are competitive, legalistic and counterproductive in achieving the real cuts that the United States and Russia are seeking according their own respective interests. Therefore, Cold War-era arms control has been swept aside by the Bush Administration in favor of unilateral reductions that better attenuate U.S. national security concerns. If the United States deployed low-yield nuclear weapons, it could open the possibility for further reductions in the U.S. strategic arsenal as missions once reserved solely for high-yield nuclear weapons could be reassigned to mini-nukes. Furthermore, a nuclear arsenal based on low-yield nuclear weapons may enhance the deterrent posture of the United States vis-?-vis rogue nations that present a more diversified, and consequently more challenging, threat spectrum to U.S. national interests.
According to Douglas J. Feith the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Cold War strategic arms control regimes were grounded in ?endless negotiation based on the threat of terror?.[65] The United States believes that in light of the uncertainty of the current security environment, fixed arsenals based on pre-set conditions assume an all-inclusive knowledge of the security environment, which is unobtainable, and that fixed arsenals may prove to be excessive or inadequate in the future to meet unforeseen security requirements.[66] John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, reaffirms this view when he stated that the ?geostrategic environment? has changed since the end of the Cold War and that the arms control environment has evolved from ?locked-in? treaties to unilateral security measures.
The United States is hesitant to engage in extensive strategic arms control treaties because it claims that treaties are inherently weak structures with little means of enforcement. American cynicism toward nuclear arms control is reflected in the following statement by Bolton, which addresses the lack of viable enforcement mechanisms for treaties, ??if somebody violates the treaty, what are you going to do? You going to sue them??because there is no court you can go to get specific performances.?[67] Along the same lines Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on August 10, 2001 claimed that treaty negotiations ?try to control hostility between two parties?We don?t have negotiations like that for treaties to not be hostile with Mexico or Canada or France or England.? Rumsfeld then went on the state that ?arms control treaties are not for friends? in obvious reference to the then nascent strategic relationship taking shape between the United States and Russia.[68]
Likewise, according to the National Security Strategy of the United States, ?the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries? and ?the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions (SORT) is emblematic of this new reality and reflects a critical change in Russian thinking.?[69] Consequently, the United States views arms control as a tool in a ?toolbox? of options available to all states as a means to secure the provisions of their own respective national interests. As stated by the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, ?arms control is not an end in itself and never has been. It is a tool to enhance security, particularly security against nuclear war.?[70]
While nuclear arms control in this sense has been deemed to no longer be in the interests of the United States, strategic arms control did serve an important function during the course of the Cold War. One of the benefits of nuclear arms control efforts in the 1970?s was the categorization of nuclear weapons into different types. The categorization of the weapons not only made the bargaining and negotiating process more manageable, but it also served to ?reinforce a concept of a graded ladder of escalation?.[71] The idea behind nuclear arms control during this era was to reinforce escalation dominance, whereby the United States would supposedly be able to respond adequately and decisively at any level of escalation in a potential conflict. The policy of escalation dominance was codified in the United States in 1980 by Presidential Directive 59, which sought to assure the political leadership that the United States would be able to maintain a countervailing strategy in the event that, if hostilities escalated beyond the nuclear threshold, the United States would be able to inflict costs that would exceed any gains that might otherwise be derived by the enemy.[72] The ability to fight effectively at all levels of conflict implies a need for flexibility, in terms of both armaments and warfighting doctrines. If and when the instruments of conducting warfare at multiple levels are in place, and this deployment is communicated effectively to potential adversaries, then the credibility of deterrence is enhanced. The correlation between the capability to defeat an adversary is directly related to the degree of credibility in effectively communicating deterrence, not only against the initiation of aggression (crisis stability), but also against incentives to escalate once hostilities are underway.
The annunciation of this relationship is one of the stated purposes of the Bush Administration?s New Triad announced in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which is ?composed of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons? in order to provide the United States with a full-range of options to counter ?a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of contingencies.?[73] Similarly, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a report titled, ?Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation? on 2 October, 2003 that emphasizes ?two missions for nuclear weapons: deterrence of an attack against Russia and de-escalation of a conflict in case deterrence fails.?[74] While both nations rely explicitly on their nuclear arsenals to communicate deterrence against aggression and escalation, the United States does not do so exclusively. The NPR recognizes that ?nuclear forces alone are unsuited to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares?, and calls for ?nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose? in order ?to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries.?[75] Therefore, one possible conclusion that one can draw from this premise is that different types of nuclear weapons, defined by their ?scale, scope and purpose?, may increase America?s ability to implement a capabilities-based approach to ?assure, dissuade, deter and defeat? real and potential enemies in the future by possessing the ability to differentiate, and fight if necessary, on several different levels of the nuclear escalation ladder.
It is possible that new types of low-yield nuclear weapons, primarily those based on a pure-fusion design, would significantly alter the composition of America?s nuclear forces such that escalation dominance could be achieved through the deployment of an instrument capable of communicating a credible countervailing strategy, and deterrence would be enhanced. However, because low-yield nuclear weapons would add a rung in the ladder of escalation in a conflict, their potential employment on the battlefield becomes dangerous if escalation can not be controlled. Since the political and physical consequences of their employment are diminished relative to their high-yield counterparts, it then becomes necessary to conceptualize limiting that employment to ensure that the incumbent high-yield nuclear threshold is not crossed by an adversary in response to a low-yield nuclear attack. However, if the United States chose to maintain at least a minimum number of high-yield nuclear weapons, it would serve to deter an enemy from launching its own high-yield nuclear weapons because of the laws of proportionality of response. The reality of the contemporary and future security environment is that the United States will continue to deploy and maintain high-yield nuclear weapons as a deterrent against other weapons of similar yields and types. The United States also seeks to ?hedge? against potential challengers and future near-peer competitors from seeking to build or acquire high-yield nuclear devices with the intent of threatening its national security interests.
New definitions are needed to categorize and distinguish between the characteristics of new fourth-generation nuclear weapons and their high-yield counterparts. Any misconception between the two will invariably lead to the conclusion that such weapons are ?taboo?, and would unfairly lump mini-nukes together with high-yield or even ?low-yield? fissionable tactical nuclear weapons, which are distinct from fusion-based, low-yield nuclear weapons. The advantage of differentiating between the two types of weapons is that it would become possible for the United States to reduce its high-yield nuclear arsenal to levels even lower than those prescribed by the 2002 Treaty of Moscow (SORT). Even modest advances in ?low-yield? nuclear applications have resulted in the retirement of the nuclear ?giants? left over from the Cold War. For instance, the introduction of the B61-Mod 11 into the U.S. stockpile in 1997 directly led to the retirement of its monstrous predecessor?the B-53.[76] The B-53 was the largest thermonuclear weapon in the world ever deployed with an expected yield of nine-megatons, more than 600 times more powerful than the weapon dropped on Hiroshima. Advancements in precision and penetration technology are likely to continue to decrease America?s reliance on higher-yield weapons, further decreasing the likelihood that they would be used in any capacity short of deterring the use of other high-yield nuclear weapons.
Section IV: The Threshold
High-Yield Vs. Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons: Crossing the Threshold?
Opponents of the Bush Administration?s ?flirtation? with the idea of developing low-yield nuclear devices argue that such a move would ?dangerously and unnecessarily? blur ?the line between conventional and nuclear weapons.?[77] For instance, if the destructive power of a nuclear reaction was harnessed and controlled in a way such that the energy released from its detonation was equal to or less than the explosive yield of a conventional explosive, then it may not be possible to distinguish between conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear deterrence would gain credibility if the traditional demarcation between conventional and nuclear forces is blurred. In this context, potential enemies may become uncertain as to whether or not the United States would use nuclear weapons in a conflict. Therefore, an argument in favor of the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons is that potential enemies of the United States would fear their possible use in combat, and would thus be deterred from attacking in the first place. Accordingly, a ?Decision Brief? issued by the Center for Security Policy notes that planning to build and use mini-nuclear weapons ?is an integral part of establishing and maintaining the credibility of our [US] deterrent.? The brief argues that ?the more credible it is [the deterrent], the less likely circumstances will arise in which our nuclear weapons have to be used.?[78] Therefore, based on this premise, the inherent usability of low-yield fusion weapons may increase the credibility of U.S. deterrence.
The taboo against high-yield nuclear weapons exists because of the features of their characteristics. The use of such weapons in combat is considered immoral because their high-yield prevents the ability to discriminate between non-combatants and soldiers, largely as the result of the massive amounts of radiation produced by their nuclear reactions. High-yield nuclear weapons also produce extraordinarily large ?footprints? because of the incredible energies released when they explode. Even modern ICBM platforms have circular error probables (CEPs) measured in the tens, if not hundreds of meters, which further distinguishes them from their low-yield counterparts. These characteristics are why high-yield weapons are more suited to deterrence than to warfighting, and why low-yield nuclear weapons may bolster deterrence because of their first-strike warfighting capability.
Arguments that the taboo against nuclear weapons use would be categorically eroded and obsolete if mini-nukes were produced and employed in combat are unfounded. Nonetheless, many critics contend that once the nuclear ?threshold? is crossed, then not only would the taboo be erased, but the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in the future would become increasingly easier as the world would supposedly become de-sensitized to wide-spread nuclear use. For instance, the authors of The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century contend that "nuclear weapons used again, anywhere in the world, would shake confidence and stability, threaten the environment, send shock waves through the world economy, threaten other nations in the region, and actually encourage states on the nuclear fence to consider acquiring these weapons for their own defensive or political purposes. The nuclear genie released again would be hard to contain."[79]
However, historical precedence seems to suggest otherwise. Critics of mini-nukes tend to forget that after the bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were not viewed as weapons of first-resort, and were not funneled up the military procurement chain as weapons of ?ultimate utility?. In fact, it was the bombing of these two cities that created the taboo against nuclear weapons in the first place; it was the physical evidence of the catastrophic devastation wrought on civilian population centers that de-popularized the utility of the weapon. Nevertheless, in hindsight, the aforementioned authors note that if nuclear weapons, similar to the ones used against Hiroshima or Nagasaki were ever used again, then complete recovery of a city and population would be possible based on historical evidence; "the Japanese reconstructed Hiroshima and Nagasaki relatively quickly and they are now normally functioning cities."[80] Therefore, the assumption that once a nuclear weapon is used in combat, it would automatically be easier to do it a second time is erroneous. Despite numerous threats to the contrary, nuclear weapons have not been used in a hostile engagement on any scale since 1945, which means that the high-yield nuclear genie remains caged and will remained caged unless the United States is directly targeted by other high-yield nuclear weapons.
It is incorrect to speculate on general consequences of a lowering of the nuclear threshold when there exists, or when there should exist, two completely different kinds of nuclear weapons, each with its own unique characteristics and applications. Just as the dawn of the nuclear age ushered in a new era of deterrence and revolutionized the waging of conventional war between two nuclear powers (limited war), so the dawn of the new nuclear age is likely to introduce new strategies and conceptions of deterrence and warfighting that will have to adapt to the pace of emerging technologies. While the continued presence of high-yield nuclear weapons is likely to continue to limit the scope of conventional warfare, the introduction of mini-nuclear nuclear weapons may increase the success of waging such wars. Therefore, proponents of low-yield nuclear weapons claim that the introduction of such weapons on the battlefield will not increase the scope of war, but will help to contain it.
Appendix A: Hypothetical Penetration Calculations
Based on the equations presented by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the maximum necessary depth for a .1kt warhead at the Nevada Test Site is 230ft. That value now becomes the desired target depth for a hypothetical high-velocity penetrator (HHVP). The set of equations needed to calculate the penetrability capability of the HHVP measured against the 230ft. mark are the updated 1997 Young/Sandia penetration equations, which have been considered the standard for calculating weapon penetrability in the United States since 1967.1 The equation is: D = 0.00178 S N (W/A)^.07 (V - 100), where D equals the depth in feet, .00178 is a constant, S equals a range of values for target density (values of 2-4 are for boulders and dense, dry or cemented land, and values of up to 30 are for very saturated soft clay), N equals a calculated coefficient for the nose of the penetrator expressed as [(.18)(L/d)+.56] (where L equals the length of the nose in inches, and d equals the diameter of the nose in inches), W equals the total weight of the penetrator, A equals the average body diameter of a tapered body, and V equals the velocity of the penetrator measured in feet per second. I plugged in variables based on a hybrid of two pre-existing designs, while taking into account the three features outlined in the paper; high-velocity, casing, and shape. Therefore, the weight of my hypothetical projectile was 5,000lbs, which is based on the weight of the B61-11 used in Nelson?s analysis. I assumed the penetrator length to be 240 inches long (20ft), which corresponds to the length of the GBU-27 penetrator and is also used in Nelson?s analysis. I calculated the nose coefficient by assuming the nose to be approximately one-quarter the length of the penetrator (60 inches), which is long, but I assumed that the projectile had a tapered shape that expanded constantly from the base of the nose the length of the penetrator. I assumed that the base of the nose was 7.48 inches based off the nose diameter for the GBU-27. I calculated the average diameter of the projectile to be 13.5 inches, accounting for an acute widening the first 60 inches in the nose to give to give the projectile a more stable shape (the projectile widens 7.48 inches the first 60 inches, and 4.17 inches every 60 inches after that), making the base 19.99 inches in diameter. I assumed the variable for S had a value of 5, which corresponds to gravel deposits and very dry and stiff soil. I calculated the velocity of the projectile to be 8580.555ft/s, which corresponds to 2500m/s. I choose this number because it is 500m/s less than what Nelson reports is possible to achieve with a missile without severely damaging its more sensitive components. Finally, I assume, but did not calculate, that the projectile was made out ultra-hard alloys using carbon fibers so that the casing had a fair chance of success of surviving my numerical barrage. By plugging all of these numbers in, the result is the following equation: D=(.00178)(5)[(.18)(60/7.48)+.56][(5,000/13.50)^.07](8680.50-100). The answer to the equation is 230.60 feet, just slightly deeper than the maximum depth that scientists at the Nevada Test Site would have buried the same device to ensure that the explosion would be fully contained so that no fallout would seep out into the atmosphere.
Appendix B: Triggering Fusion
The most likely method that would be used to trigger a pure-fusion weapon is called the ?z-pinch? developed at Sandia National Laboratory. Below is a brief description of how the technology works. A cylinder of very thin wires is heated by means of an electric current, which begins to produce an electromagnetic field corresponding to an increase in temperature as the wires burn. The ensuing magnetic field compresses the wires he cylinder of wires into a small diameter. As the diameter shrinks, the wires melt and turn into plasma. At a certain compression point, the plasma becomes instantly frozen in time in a process called stagnation. During stagnation, the kinetic energy of the plasma is converted into X-rays, which would have the capability to sufficiently compress a D-D or D-T pellet to begin a fusion chain reaction.2 The electric current needed to in order to heat the wires sufficiently for compression could be achieved by using a small amount of advanced chemical explosives that would generate a significant amount of ?pulsed power? instantly.3 This type of device may alleviate the current need for a fission-based primary or trigger, to ignite the chain reaction of the secondary (the actual fusionable elements).
1 Young, C.W., ?Penetration Equations?, Sandia National Laboratories, October, 1997; http://www.prod.sandia.gov/cgi-bin/techlib/access-control.pl/1997/972426.pdf.
2 Makhijani, Arjun and Hisham Zerriffi, ?Dangerous Thermonuclear Quest: The Potential of Explosive Fusion Research for the Development of Pure Fusion Weapons?, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, July 1998; www.ieer.org/reports/fusion/fusn-toc.html.
3 Jones, Suzanne L., and Frank N. von Hippel, ?The Question of Pure Fusion Explosions Under the CTBT?, Science and Global Security, Vol. 7, 1998, pp. 129-150; www.princeton.edu/%7Eglobsec/publications/pdf/7_2Jones.pdf.
[1] Bromely, Mark, ?Bunker Busters: Washington?s Drive for New Nuclear Weapons?, British American Security Information Council, July 2002, p. 25.
[2] Most warheads in the US nuclear arsenal have yields that range from 100 to 475kt, which are ten to forty times more powerful than the blasts that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. See Fergusen, Charles D., ?Mini-Nuclear Weapons and the US Nuclear Posture Review?, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Research Story of the Week, 8 April, 2002; www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020408.htm.
[3] Freedman, Lawrence, ?The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists?, in ed. Peter Paret, ?Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age?, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 773.
[4] Press Trust of India, ?India Can Make Neutron Bomb, Says Atomic Energy Commission Chief?, NA, Indian Express Newspapers, 17 August, 1999; http://www.expressindia.com/fe/daily/19990817/fec17005.html.
[5] Bleek, Philipp C., ?Energy Department to Study Modifying Nuclear Weapons?, Arms Control Today, April 2002.
[6] For instance, the US had four different kinds of nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea in 1958: 1) the Honest John surface-surface missile, 2) a 280mm nuclear cannon, 3) an 8-inch nuclear artillery shell, and 3) Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM). Also, in 1960, Davy Crockett nuclear bazookas were added to the US nuclear arsenal on the Penninsula, which were basically mini-fission nuclear weapons. By 1967, the US retained approximately 950 warheads on eight different kinds of weapon platforms. However, by 1991, George Bush ordered the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from South Korea, and this was completed in 1992.; Information provided by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) as presented by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 59, No. 2, March/April 2003, p. 74.
[7] Gsponer, Andre, Jean-Pierre Hurni, and Bruno Vitale, ?A Comparison of Delayed Radiobiological Effects of Depleted Uranium Munitions Versus Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons?, ArXiv.org, 1 December, 2002, p. 1; http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/physics/pdf/0210/0210071.pdf.
[8] Wikipedia, ?Neutron Bomb?; www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutron_bomb.
[9] Gsponer, Andre, ?From the Lab to the Battlefield? Nanotechnology and Fourth-Generation Nuclear Weapons?, Disarmament Diplomacy, Opinion and Analysis, No. 67., October/November 2002; www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/67op1.htm.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] The weapons are considered ?pure-fusion? because some device other than fissionable materials would be used to trigger the fusion
[13] Ibd.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Gsponer, Hurni, and Vitale, pp. 8-11.
[17] Wikipedia, ?Neutron Fallout?; www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutron_fallout.
[18] Bresnahan, David M., ?China Test-Detonates Kiloton Neutron Bomb?, WorldNetDaily.com, April 1999; http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~wbova/fn/gov/china_nb.htm.
[19] Gsponer.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Gsponer, Hurni, and Vitale, p. 1
[24] Ibid., p. 7.
[25] Nelson, Robert W., ?Low-Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons?, The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, Public Interest Report, Vol. 54, No. 1, January/February, 2001; www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1/weapons.htm.
[26] See United Press International, ?Scientists Take Aim at Low-Yield Nukes?, 18 April, 2001 for an example of a critique on low-yield nuclear weapons based soley on Dr. Nelson?s study. See also The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, BulletinWire Archive, 19 April, 2001; www.thebulletin.org/bulletinwirearchive/BulletinWire010419.html.
[27] Ibid. See also Dr. Sidney Drell, professor emeritus at Stanford University whose different numbers conclude that in order for a five-kiloton weapon to produce no fallout, it would have to be detonated about 350 feet deep, but "we don't know how to go below 50 [feet]"; Media Advisory, ?Senators, Scientists Say Congress Should Reject Bush Administration's Proposals for New Nuclear Weapons?, Arms Control Association, 1 May, 2003.
[28] Nelson. See also Nair, Vijai K., ?Conventional and Nuclear Earth Penetrator Bombs in the US Arsenal?, Strategic Affairs, No. 0030, 16 October, 2001; http://www.stratmag.com/issue2Oct-15/page03.htm#a01 for a discussion of the GBU-27, a guided bomb unit that is 19ft. long and can penetrate 100ft. of soil.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] In long-rod penetrability, the single biggest penetrability factor to Nelson is the inverse proportionality of the length and density of the penetrator relative to the same values for the target in question, which is strange considering Nelson doesn?t think that the yield strength of the penetrator is very important, Ibid. On the other hand, other analysis points to the primacy of the ratio of the length of the penetrator to its diameter, measured by L/D. See Lee, M., ?Analysis of Jacketed Rod Penetration?, International Journal of Impact Engineering, No. 24, 2000; pp. 895-901.
[33] ?Nuclear Weapon Testing?, Federation of American Scientists, NA; http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/test.htm.
[34] Nelson.
[35] ?External Propulsion Round?, from Periscope web source; http://www.periscope.ucg.com/terms/t0000325.html.
[36] ?Exploring Carbon Nanotubes?, Oakland Ridge National Labotatory Review, NA; www.ornl.gov/ORNLReview/v35_3_02/nanotubes.shtml.
[37] Erengil, Mehmet, Steve Kornguth, and James Valdes, ?Novel Projectile Concept for High-Speed Penetration of Concrete Targets?, Institute for Advanced Technology, Presented at the 23rd Army Science Conference, Orlando, FL, 2-5 December, 2002; www.asc2002.com/summaries/c/CP-10.pdf.
[38] 2001 NPR, pp. 24-25.
[39] Gronlund, Lisbeth, and David Wright, ?Earth-Penetrating Weapons?, Union of Concerned Scientists, Backgrounder; www.ucusa.org/secuirty/epw.html..
[40] Globalsecurity.org, ?Small Diameter Bomb/ Small Smart Bomb?, Globalsecurity.org; www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm.
[41] Gronlund and Wright.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Beckman, Peter R., Paul W. Crumlish, Michael N. Dubkowski, and Steven Pl Lee, "The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century", (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2000), p. 8.
[44] Ibid., p. 18.
[45] Butler, Richard, ?Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense?, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), p. 59.
[46] Helen Dewar and Walter Pincus, ?Senate Retains Nuclear Research Funds?, Washington Post, 17 September, 2003, p. A06; www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21347-2003Sep16.
[47] The National Resources Defense Council provides archival data of nuclear weapons stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation from 1945 up to 2002; www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp.
[48] Preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
[49] Overview of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Inventory of International Non-Proliferation Organizations and Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
[50] Preamble to the NPT.
[51] Butler, Richard, ?Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense?, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), p. 73.
[52] Campbell, Kurt M., "Nuclear Proliferation Beyond Rogues", The Wahsington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2002-2003, p. 7.
[53] Preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
[54] Bromley, Mark, ?Planning to be Surprised: The US Nuclear Posture Review and its Implications for Arms Control?, BASIC Papers, No. 39, April, 2002, p. 6; www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP39.htm.
[55] DTRA Advanced Systems and Concepts Office Publications, ?The Future Integrity of the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Alternative Nuclear Worlds and Implications for US Nuclear Policy?, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, April 2001; www.dtra.mil/about/organization/integrity.doc.
[56] Preamble to the NPT.
[57] Butler, p. 69.
[58] The Economist, NA, ?Holding the Line; Nuclear Proliferation?, Vol. 366, Issue 8307, 18 January, 2003.
[59] Calabresi, Massimo, ?Now It?s Iran?s Turn to Play the Nuke Card?, Time, Vol. 161, Issue 11, 17 March, 2003, p. 14.
[60] This view is presented by John Feffer; see Feffer, John, ?Toward a New Foreign Policy?, Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 7, Issue 14, December, 2002, p. 3.
[61] North Korea Profile, Country Information, supplied by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website; www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index.html.
[62] CNN.com, ?Tenet: North Korea Has Ballistic Missile Capable of Hitting US?, 12 February, 2003; www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/12/us.nkorea/.
[63] Kimbal, Daryl, ?North Korea: What?s Next??, Arms Control Association ?E-Update Editorial?, 2 May, 2003.
[64] Kimball, Daryl, ?Beyond the ?Axis of Evil? ?, Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, Issue 1, January/February 2003, p. 2.
[65]Comments by Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Senate Armed Services Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review, 14 February, 2002.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Interview with John Bolton by members of Arms Control Today on 11 Februrary, 2002. For a complete transcript of this interview, see www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/boltonmarch02.asp
[68] Cirincione, Joseph and Jon B. Wolfsthal, ?What if the New Strategic Framework Goes Bad??, Arms Control Today, November, 2001; www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_11/cirincionenov01.asp.
[69] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Section VIII: ?Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power?.
[70] House Policy Committee, ?Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program?, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, February, 2003.
[71] Freedman, p. 775.
[72] Ibid.
[73] 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), p. 7; available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
[74] Sokov, Nikolai, ?Russian Ministry of Defense?s New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle?, CNS Reports, 10 October, 2003; http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sok1003.htm.
[75] NPR, p. 7.
[76] Pincus, Walter, ?Powerhouse H-Bomb Heads for Graveyard?, Washington Post, 8 August, 2002, p. A10.
[77] Levi, Michael, ?Fallout?W?s Strange Flirtation with Tactical Nukes?, The New Republic, 17 February, 2003, p. 12.
[78] Decision Brief, ?The Bush Nuclear Posture Review: Adults at Work Restoring the Credibility of America?s Deterrent?, Center for Security Policy, 11 March, 2002; www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=02-D_14.
[79] Beckman, Peter R., Paul W. Crumlish, Michael N. Dubkowski, and Steven Pl Lee, "The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century", (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2000), p. 8.
[80] Ibid., p. 9.
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