Richard Garwin suggests a compromise space weapons treaty that would prohibit new anti-satellite weapon tests, but still allow for temporary and reversible attacks (ex. jamming, concealment, interference with the line of sight, etc) on non-strategic space assets.
Richard L. Garwin argues that instead of rushing to deploy a flawed and untested missile defense system, "military contractors, technologists and politicians should pay more attention to evaluating the relative magnitudes of the threats" and shift scarce resources to the "development of alternative systems that would have a real chance of stopping ICBMs."
Richard Garwin examines the new breed of terrorists and argues for common-sense measures that utilize market incentives wherever possible.
Richard L. Garwin argues in favor of a boost-phase intercept missile defense system as an alternative to the current administration's plans.
Richard L. Garwin critiques the administration's missile defense proposal and offers a remarkable alternative that would be less suspectible to common countermeasures, more accurate than the current system, and less likely to violate existing treaties and anger Russia and China.
A refreshingly thorough argument against missile defense. Garwin argues "the proposed NMD system would have essentially zero capability against the most likely emerging threat-- an ICBM from North Korea."