The author notes that the existing norm against nuclear proliferation, enshrined in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is fast eroding. He argues that a better alternative would be to negotiate a new agreement that would establish an international agency to control the production and distribution of fissile material for peaceful nuclear purposes.

A recently declassified U.S. intelligence estimate, reveals a surprising truth about U.S. nuclear arms policy over the past three decades: The US government believed that dramatic increases in the number of nuclear actors on the world stage were ''inevitable."

Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center argues that a U.S. push for military dominance in space could backfire by damaging international efforts to curb WMD proliferation.

The Bush Administration's policy towards Iran indicates an attempt to re-negotiate the terms of the non-proliferation treaty by denying certain states the right to develop their own nuclear power programs.

The author analyzes how the U.S. policy of protesting the development of nuclear weapons technology in some states like Iran or North Korea but not in others like Brazil or Pakistan has undermind the global norm against nonproliferation.

Analysts are concerned that Iran's development of laser enrichment technology to produce uranium for its nuclear program is an indicator that not only has the nonproliferation export control regime has failed but that its too late to do anything about it.

U.S. Senators Edward Kennedy and Diane Feinstein argue that the Bush administration's strong stance against nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea is undercut by U.S. efforts to develop and build a new generation of nuclear weapons.

International inspectors report that Iran's nuclear-energy scientists have produced uranium metal and are testing powerful green lasers -- potential steps toward an exotic means of harvesting weapons fuel that so far has been the exclusive province of developed nuclear nations.

Arms control experts warn that North Korea and Iran appear to have succeeded in mounting clandestine programs for enriching uranium for weapons by breaking through a number of legal and technological safeguards with the help a shadowy new "proliferation ring," or distribution network, involving a number of less developed countries.

Henry Skoliski argues for a new international nonproliferation regime that would restrict nuclear energy technology and fissile material from states developing nuclear weapons.