The authors argue that the Obama administration's moves to pursue and strengthen nuclear arms control is weakening the U.S. nuclear deterrent and inviting attack.

The U.S. defense community is debating the furture of its nuclear arsenal at a time when both it's competence in handling the world's largest arsenal has been called into question and when international efforts to contain the spread of such weapons look increasingly ineffective.

Barry Posen argues that containing and deterring the threat of a nuclear Iran is preferrable to the consquences that would result from military action to prevent it.

China is building up its nuclear forces as part of a secret strategy targeting the United States, according to a former Chinese diplomat.

Russia is relying more and more on its strategic nuclear arsenal as its conventional strength continues to deteriorate.

The current negotiations with Iran over their possible nuclear weapons program show that a country can gain just as much credibility by demonstrating the capacity to develop a nuclear weapons program (a "virtual bomb") as if they were to actually test one.

The author argues that for the U.S. nuclear arsenal to remain an effective deterrent, our nuclear weapons "must have greatly increased accuracy, reduced yields, specialized capabilities (such as deep earth penetration) and tailored effects (such as ability to neutralize chemical-biological agents)."

Israel continues to produce atomic weapons and already has hundreds of nuclear warheads, researchers said as the country released a man imprisoned for 18 years for leaking nuclear secrets.

The United States and Russia unnecessarily continue to maintain thousands of strategic nuclear missiles on high alert for mutual deterrence, heightening the possibility of a catastrophic, unintended launch, according to Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information.

"In light of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, some scholars argue that the use of extended-range weapons does not provide deterrence and invites unnecessary risks. In this article, Dr. Butterworth contends that deploying only a small number of ICBMs will not erode US deterrence and that proposing a nonnuclear alternative of conventional ICBMs might boost, rather than erode, Russian confidence that a US nuclear strike is highly unlikely."