The top officials charged with protecting the United States against a biological attack played down concerns that a new agent could exterminate the human race but warned that the threat of new, engineered pathogens remains serious.
Experts argue that there are still significant technical and logistical barriers that discourage terrorists from developing weapons of mass destruction.
More than 750 of the nation's leading microbiological researchers have openly called on the Bush Administration to return the nation's scientific focus to more basic pathogens and away from the few rare bacteria and viruses that could be used as weapons by terrorists.
Analysts debate the prospects for the best and worst case scenarios for nanotechnology.
The far-fetched theory that nanotechnology could lead to a 'grey goo' catastrophe has captured the public imagination despite being discredited by scientists.
The author questions the assumptions behind the existing mock scenarios and mathematical models that attempt to predict the magnitude of an outbreake of smallpox.
The author argues that the federal rush to find antidotes for biological weapons is diverting essential funding from the fight against greater risks like cancer.
The author argues that federal funding for bioterrorism research is causing a brain drain of infectious-disease specialists from more realistic threats like tuberculosis and cholera.
So-called new terrorists may not always escalate to unconventional weapons. Inordinate attention on the comparatively unique challenges of WMD terrorism draws scarce resources and focus away from the more basic but essential activities to stop terrorism in the first place.
Experts have said that the Bush administration?s plans for increased biological defense research could take away necessary funding from other medical research projects.