Projecting the future of space utilization, including the weaponization of space, is fraught with peril. Nader Elhefnawy looks back at one particularly alarmist prediction and what it means for current concerns about military activities in space.
Gregory Kulacki exposes the misperceptions and mistranslations in U.S. intelligence assessments of China's military and space efforts.
U.S. biodefense advocates have been "crying wolf" on the potential for catastrophic bioterrorism, playing up worst-case scenarios and driving billions of dollars into developing questionable defenses against questionable threats, according to a U.S. military analyst.
James Oberg argues that a "sobre reality check" is needed in the current debate about space weapons. "Space hardware with weapons-like applications has also been around, on Earth and in space, for decades — but using it to break things in orbit never made much military sense, then or now or in the foreseeable future."
Dwayne Day argues that the media often has problems distinguishing between reality and fantasy on this topic, and in the process misses the real problems with military space programs.
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg responds to a recent article in Technology Review that argued advances in genetic engineering technology made 'home-brewed' biological weapons a real possibility. Rosenberg argues that more attention should be paid to known government research into biological weapons than the hypothetical risks from bioterrorism.
A Bush administration program intended to guard against bioterrorism could actually make it more likely that the United States would be threatened with novel biological agents for which there are no vaccines or other defenses.
" In justifying the accelerated deployment of a nationwide anti-missile system, the Bush administration has cited a growing missile threat, particularly from North Korea. But the extent of North Korea's missile program is open to debate."
The far-fetched theory that nanotechnology could lead to a 'grey goo' catastrophe has captured the public imagination despite being discredited by scientists.
The author argues that agroterrorism "remains little more than a set of hypothetical worst-case scenarios" and unduly diverts attention from the greater risks of food-borne illness.