Serious reliability problems in systems subject to sudden criticality can be caused by boredom, drinking or drug taking, habit and routine, isolation, and sustained high levels of stress. Nuclear military forces require that groups of people act together, but transferring capability and responsibility from individuals to groups does not by itself protect against the limits of safety imposed by human error, illness, or malevolence. While practical steps can minimize the risks of human fallibility, there is no way to completely eliminate the potential for catastrophe in nuclear military systems except by completely eliminating nuclear weapons.
Proposals made by the US government in recent years to intensify medical and public health preparedness for bioterrorism have received additional impetus from anthrax attacks following September 11, 2001. The threat has been exaggerated to support military and law enforcement agendas; resources have been diverted from essential public health priorities; ineffective or dangerous measures have been used; and public health programs have been inappropriately commingled with security programs.
Researchers estimate the number of direct, short term casualties and collateral damage to US medical services as a result of two thermonuclear attack scenarios: an accidental launch of russian nuclear forces, and a full-scale attack of Russian nuclear warheads in response to U.S. deployment of missile defense.